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Suppression of Evidence in
Criminal Tax Proceedings
By JACOB W. MAYm*
The first decision to be made by a taxpayer threatened with
prosecution for federal tax fraud is whether to "cooperate" with
the Internal Revenue Service by providing its agents with re-
quested testimony or documents. A polciy of nondisclosure may
effectively prevent criminal prosecution, or it may only serve to
jeopardize a subsequent claim of good faith. This paper is con-
cerned with the extent to which a taxpayer can suppress various
types of information which might be used against him in a crim-
inal prosecution for federal tax fraud.' No attempt will be made
to consider the justifications for a decision to suppress or not to
suppress, nor will consideration be given to problems involving
evidence which is not to be suppressed as a matter of right but
which may be inadmissible at a trial, for one reason or another.
Analysis of areas in which evidence may be suppressed re-
quires examination of issues arising under the fourth and fifth
amendments to the United States Constitution, problems created
by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and problems which are
created by the investigatory processes of the Internal Revenue
Service in its examination of taxpayers suspected of tax fraud.
To provide a description of the background in which these
problems normally arise, the investigatory processes of the In-
ternal Revenue Service will be considered first.
TBm JonT INVESTIGATION
The Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service
is primarily responsible for discovering tax frauds. Members
of this division are known as "special agents;" they serve a
* LL.B., University of Kentucky, LL.M., George Washington University.
Attorney-Adviser, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D. C.
1 Tax fraud is being used here as a generic term for the offenses defined in
§ 7202-7214 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
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separate function from the more familiar revenue agents who
are concerned with the routine audit of taxpayers' records.
Special agents may become suspicious of taxpayers for any of
a number of reasons. If they do, they are then charged with
the duty of gathering the evidence to substantiate a criminal
charge against the taxpayer. For both practical and theoretical
reasons, the taxpayer will not be informed that he is under
investigation. The special agent will first seek to gather what
information he can obtain from other sources, such as bank
records, without immediately employing his statutory right to
issue a summons.2
The joint investigation, which involves a revenue agent and
a special agent working together, is the usual evidence-gather-
ing technique. The revenue agent contacts and examines the
taxpayer, without warning him that he is under investigation for
suspected tax fraud, and then reports his findings to the special
agent.3 If the joint investigation does not exonerate the suspected
taxpayer, the special agent will then issue a statutory summons,
returnable in ten days.4 During this period, the taxpayer has
time to engage counsel.5
STATUTORY PROTEcnoN FROM UNNECEssARY EXAMINATION
Before proceeding to the problems which arise during the
course of or after an investigation, consideration must first be
given to the taxpayer's right, created by the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954,' not to be subjected to unnecessary examination.
As a result of this provision, a taxpayer may be able to bar an
investigation by insisting on his right not to have his records
for a given tax year examined more than once.
7
The protection of section 7605(b) will not be available to
all taxpayers under investigation and, even where available, will
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602.
3 There is no duty to warn a taxpayer that he is being examined for the
purpose of initiating a criminal prosecution. United States v. Burdick, 214 F.2d
768 (Sd Cir. 1954); Montgomery v. United States, 203 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1953).
Especially since prosecution may not be planned at the time of the investigation.
Hanson v. United States, 186 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1950).
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 7602 & 7605(a).
5 It is possible that even this protection may prove to be illusory if a
revenue agent calls upon the taxpayer with a summons and claims the right to
take papers of the taxpayer. In re Jack Klein, Ryan, D. J. (S.D.N.Y. 1956),
M-18-304, not officially reported. For a discussion of the problem, see Kostel-
anetz & Bender, Criminal Aspects of Tax Fraud Cases 44 (1957).
6Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7605(b).
7See Pacific Mills v. Kenefick, 99 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1938).
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probably prove to be only a source of delay. The restrictions
imposed by this section may be removed if a written request is
made by the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate to the
taxpayer stating that it is necessary to reexamine the taxpayer's
records. 8 An allegation of. suspected tax fraud will be accepted
as, a justification for such additional examination, even with
regard to years which would be closed by limitations in the
absence of suspected tax fraud.' The written request to the
taxpayer probably does not have to allege the existence of
evidence of tax fraud; a bare allegation that tax fraud is sus-
pected should be sufficient.10 The requirement of only a bare
allegation seems consistent with the language and intent of the
statute, since it is difficult to argue that an investigation designed
to uncover a criminal act is either "unreasonable' or "unneces-
sary."" In any event, whether or not some existing evidence sug-
gesting the possibility of tax fraud is prerequisite to issuance of
a letter pursuant to section 7605(b), actual proof of fraud is
not required.' 2
It seems clear that the failure of a taxpayer to prevent an
investigation by claiming his section 7605(b) right should not
preclude him from later asserting either his constitutional rights
or any privileges available to him. Because of this, a claim of
the section 7605(b) right may be made either in order to gain
time or in the hope of obtaining niformation regarding the direc-
tion of the investigation.
CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS
The taxpayer's attorney who has acted in a strictly profes-
sional capacity will fall within the scope of the usual sanction
against revealing confidential communications with his client.
Illustrative of the great scope which has been given to this priv-
ilege in the criminal tax area is Schwimmer v. United States.
13
An attorney had left his office files with a storage company. A
federal grand jury investigating tax frauds served a subpoena
8 In re Paramount Jewelry Co., Inc., 80 F.Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
9Application of House, 144 F.Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956); In re Brooklyn
Pawnbrokers, Inc., 39 F.Supp 304 (E.D. N.Y. 1941).
10 In re Wood, 123 F. Supp. 297 (W.D. Ky. 1954) but see In re Andrews
Tax Liability, 18 F.Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1937).
11 Cf. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 743 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
846 U.S. 864 (1953).
1Inre Paramount Jewelry Co., Inc., 80 F.Supp. 375 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
18 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 852 U.S. 833 (1956).
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duces tecum, upon the third party custodian in an effort to ob-
tain the files, but the subpoena was quashed upon motion by
the attorney, on the ground that it violated the fourth amend-
ment since the fies contained material within the scope of the
attorney-client relationship.
14
A bona fide attorney-client relationship must have existed,
and the matter sought to be protected must have resulted from
it,'0 if a claim of confidential communication is to be sustained.
Thus, the testimony of an attorney who has acted solely as a
repository for funds is not privileged.' 6 Likewise, an atorney who
has acted only as an accountant can not claim the attorney-client
privilege to protect his work.'- However, the privilege may be
sustained although only part of a communication, contains priv-
ileged matters.'
8
The services of a trained accountant are normally essential
for both the preparation and trial of a tax case. Nonetheless, the
federal courts in criminal tax cases have consistently refused
to consider disclosures made to an accountant to be privileged
as confidential communications.' One obvious consequence of
this rule is that the taxpayer's attorney in a tax fraud case must
be sure that the taxpayers accountant is not present at any
meeings where confidential matters are to be discussed by the
attorney and client, since the presence of the third party ac-
countant may constitute a waiver of the attorney-client priv-
ilege.20 The accountant's inability to protect confidential com-
munications obtained from the defendant poses substantial prob-
lems for the defendant's attorney, who must decide that infor-
14 Had the client deposited the documents with the storage company, it is
doubtful if he could have asserted even a fifth amendment privilege. See 8
Wigmore, Evidence § 2264(a) (3d ed. 1940). As a matter of policy, it seems
a questionable practice to protect records placed in the hands of an attorney
if the client could not have claimed a privilege for the records. See Falsone v.
United States, 205 F.2d 734, 789 (5th Cir., cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
15 See Remmer v. United States, 205 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1953), vacated on
other grounds, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), rehearing granted, 348 U.S. 904 (1954).
10 Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1953).
17 Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1954).
18 Cf. United States v. United States Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357
(D. Mass. 1950), prob. juris. noted, 848 U.S. 894 (1953).
19 Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 864 (1953 ; United States v. Stoehr, 100 F.Supp. 143 (M.D. Pa. 1951), aff'd,
196 F.2d 276 3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 826 (1952); Himmelfarb
v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860
(1949).2 0 himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 860 (1949).
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mation can be entrusted to the accountant. Attempts have been
made to avoid the difficulties inherent in dealing with the de-
fendant's accountant on this basis, by the device of having the
attorney retain an accountant directly, rather than having the
taxpayer retain him. However, it appears that this tactic will
be unsuccessful in the ordinary criminal tax case.21
A similar problem is presented in states which have enacted
statutes extending a privilege to confidential communications
with accountants. These statutory privileges have not been
recognized in federal criminal tax proceedings.22 The refusal to
recognize privileges granted by state statutes is based upon
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which pro-
vides, in pertinent part, as follows:
The . . .privileges of witnesses shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the Courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience.
23
Since the common law did not recognize a privilege for con-
fidential communications with an accountant, the question be-
comes whether the "reason and experience" requirement de-
mands recognition of the privilege.
A narrow construction of statutory privileges to limit their
scope so far as possible has been adopted in applying Rule 26.
A statement typical of this approach occurs in Pollock v. United
States,24 as follows:
Congress has not given the states the power of prescribing
the rules of evidence in trials for offenses against the
United States. In criminal cases in the federal courts,
the admissibility of evidence and the competency and the
privileges of witnesses are governed, except when an Act
of Congress or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
otherwise provide, by the principles of the common law
as interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience.
25
Another theory, which serves to avoid a state statutory priv-
ilege for accountants during the investigatory stage, was
21Ibid. And see Gariepy v. United States, 189 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1951).2 2 E.g. Falsome v. United States, supra note 14.
28 18 U.S.C. following sec. 687.
24 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1958).
25 Id. at 285.
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adopted in the leading case Falsone v. United States.26 An in-
ternal revenue agent issued a statutory summons to require a
Florida C.P.A. to produce records of a client who was not
then under indictment, but who was being investigated for
tax fraud, and to give testimony regarding them. The sum-
mons was issued despite the fact that Florida had enacted a
privilege statute for communications with accountants. The
C.P.A. claimed the statutory privilege on behalf of his client
and moved to quash the summons, arguing that, in the absence
of formal action by the Internal Revenue Service, the proceed-
ing was civil rather than criminal and the state privilege stat-
ute must be respected. This argument was rejected on the
theory that an investigation initiated by an agent's statutory
summons is inquisitorial in nature and does not fall within the
scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court then
held that the state statutory privilege was not applicable and
denied the motion to quash.27
The suggestive case of Brodson v. United States28 deserves
attention in considering whether the "reason and experience"
requirement of Rule 26 should require recognition of a priv-
ilege for confidential communications with accountants, wheth-
er or not a state statute is involved. A jeopardy assessment
was made against Brodson and liens were filed against his prop-
erty. After the liens attached, an indictment was returned
which charged Brodson with a willful attempt to evade the
income tax and indicated that the government intended to
prove the evasion by the "net worth" method. Defendant
moved to dismiss the indictment arguing, among other things,
that the initiation of the criminal prosecution during the pend-
ency of the jeopardy assessment would deprive him of due
26205 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
27A collateral determination made in this decision is also noteworthy.
The C.P.A. was enrolled by the Treasury Department as an agent entitled to
represent taxpayers, effectively on an equal footing with attorneys so enrolled.
Accordingly, the accountant claimed that confidential communications between
an enrolled agent and his client should be privileged. This argument was re-
jected on the grounds that the Treasury's Regulations did not extend such a
privilege to enrolled agents and that, even if such a privilege were granted,
it would be inconsistent with the statute which does not impose limitations on
the information to be obtained by means of a revenue agent's statutory sum-
mons. Id. at 740-41. But see 8 Wigmore, Eivdence § 2300(a) (3d ed. 1940).
28 136 F.Supp. 158 (E.D. Wisc. 1955), reversed, 284 F.2d 97 (7th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957), rehearing, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.1957).
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process and the effective assistance of counsel, in violation of
the fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitu-
tion, since he was unable to use his attached funds to retain
an accountant to aid in meeting the government's net worth
proof.
After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court
judge indicated that if the government did not see fit to re-
lease the liens in part to provide funds for defendant to retain
an accountant, he would incline to the view that defendant
was being deprived of a fair trial. The government informed
the court that it was without authority to release the liens on
any part of defendant's property. The district court thereupon
dismissed he indictment, holding that defendant could not
refute the government's net worth evidence without the serv-
ices of a trained accountant.
2 9
The government appealed this decision to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit which reversed the district court
in a 3-2 decision on rehearing following an initial 2-1 reversal.3 0
The basis of the majority opinion was that the ruling of the dis-
trict court was premature and speculative since it was not certain
either that the defendant would not have the services of an
accountant by the time of trial or that, even if he did not, his
rights would necessarily be prejudiced by the lack thereof.
However, the majority specifically refused to rule on the district
court's determination that the services of an accountant were
essential in providing an effective defense, since it was not
necessary to reach the issue.
31
The weight to be given the Brodson case is a matter for
speculation, particularly since, as noted in the majority opin-
ion, it has ramifications outside of the tax field in such matters
as the right of an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding
to claim the services of a court-appointed psychiatrist to aid in
preparing an "effective" defense of insanity. At the same time,
the decision is noteworthy because it contains a measure of
recognition of the essential role of the accountant in the de-
fense of a criminal tax case. To the extent that this view of the
accountant's role as essential is accepted, it appears that "reason
29 136 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wisc. 1955).
30 234 F.2d 97, rehearing, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir. 1957).
31 241 F.2d at 110.
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and experience" require an interpretation of Rule 26 which would
confer a privilege upon confidential communications with ac-
countants, whether or not the applicable state law requires the
recognition of such a privilege.
FIFTH AMENDMENT PROBLEMS
Fifth amendment problems arise as soon as the taxpayer is
contacted by either a revenue agent or a special agent. The tax-
payer who is called upon by a revenue agent may claim his
privilege under the fifth amendment. 32 However, if the taxpayer
does not claim his privilege, there is no duty to inform him of
his right to do so.3" Should the taxpayer attempt to conceal his
previous offense by a misrepresentation to the agent, it is pos-
sible to treat this as a separate offense.34
If the taxpayer is taken unawares by the revenue agent, he
may make admissions which he later wishes to suppress. In this
case, even though the taxpayer later claims his fifth amendment
privilege, the agent is able to repeat a selection of the most dam-
aging testimony.38 This poses a serious problem for the tax-
payer's attorney who may be unable to get a clear description
before trial of what evidence his client has removed from the
protection of the fifth amendment.
If the taxpayer's statements to the revenue agent have been
extensive enough, they may serve to waive completely his priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. 6 However, since the taxpayer
is so subject to being taken off guard in the investigatory process,
the courts carefully scrutinize such statements. The govern-
ment bears the burden of proving that a statement was made
freely. 7 If it appears that the taxpayer was induced to make a
statement as a result of either coercion or a promise, it will be
suppressed. 8
32 United States v. Vadner, 119 F.Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
33 United States v. Burdick, 214 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1954); Montgomery v.
United States, 203 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1953); Hanson v. United States, 186
F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1950).
34 United States v. Beacon Brass, Inc., 344 U.S. 43 (1952).
35 Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 128-129 (1954).
36 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).37 Hanson v. United States, 186 F2d 61 (8th Cir. 1950); United States v.
Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir. 1955); Application of Russo, 19 F.R.D. 278
(E.D. N.Y. 1956).
3 8 In re Leibster, 91 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Pa. 1950); but see Centracchio v.
Garrity, 198 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1952). For an illustration of the problems in-
volved with a corporation which can assert only a fourth amendment right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, see United States v. Harte-Hanks News-
papers, 254 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1958).
1960]
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The fifth amendment privilege must be affirmatively claimed
by the taxpayer. Even if the taxpayer is responding to a sum-
mons, he must make a timely claim of his privilege against self-
incrimination or it may be deemed to have been waived.39
A taxpayer may protect his personal records by asserting
his fifth amendment privilege. 40 However, it is doubtful how
much further the fifth amendment privilege for records extends.
It has long been settled that a defendant can not suppress corp-
orate records which can incriminate him, even though he pre-
pared the records himself.4' Between the clean-cut extremes of
personal and corporate records lies the shadow of partnership
records. It has been held that a partner in a small general part-
nership may claim the privilege against self-incrimination and
suppress the records of the partnership.42 However, the priv-
ilege has not been extended to large "impersonal partnerships
and, in fact, recognition of a privilege to suppress the records
of any partnership has been criticized.43
A limitation upon a taxpayer's ability to suppress even per-
sonal financial records has been threatening to develop on the
basis of a group of cases originating in the extensive federal
control required during World War II. At that time, various
government agencies required private citizens to keep different
types of potentially incriminating records and later successfully
maintained their right to compel the disclosure of these records
on the basis that they were quasi-public records.44 The objection
to this development was made clear by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
dissenting in Shapiro v. United States,45 as follows:
If Congress by the easy device of requiring a man to keep
the private papers that he has customarily kept can render
such papers 'public' and nonprivileged, there is little left
to either the right of privacy or the constitutional priv-
ilege.46
89 Brody v. United States, 243 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 923 (1957). And see Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).4 0 United States v. Vadner, 119 F.Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
41 Wlson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
421n re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1948) and see
United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. N.Y. 1953).43 E.g. United States v. Ouassis, 133 F. Supp. 327, 333 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
44 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 445 (1947) (selective service records);
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) (O.P.A. records).
45335 U.S. 1 (1948).
461d. at 70.
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In view of the present statutory requirement that taxpayers
maintain records which are to be available for inspection,47 it
is possible that they might be treated as quasi-public records
not entitled to the protection of the fifth amendment. To date,
most courts have refused to extend the reasoning of the Shapiro
case into the criminal tax field.48 This reluctance has not been
universal. In Beard v. United States,49 the Shapiro case was held
to justify the limited infringement of allowing the government
to comment on the defendant's claim of privilege, and similar
results have already been reached in other cases.50
FouRTn AmENDmENT PROBLEMS
Fourth amendment problems frequently arise in the same
situations which present fifth amendment problems, since often
the government is concerned with obtaining the taxpayer's
records rather than his direct testimony. Of course, the scope
of fourth amendment is limited since only "unreasonable"
searches and seizures are prohibited. If a taxpayer is able to
establish that seized records are entitled to the protection of his
fourth amendment privilege, the usual federal rule will allow
them to be suppressed.51 Evidence developed with the seized
records should also be suppressed.52
A revenue agent has a statutory right to inspect a taxpayer's
books in order to determine the correctness of a tax return.
53
However, the agent has no right to inspect the taxpayer's books
without permission, nor does he have the right to seize them
after his inspection.54 The permission granted to a revenue agent
to enter a taxpayer's premises in order to inspect his books is
not an invitation to go beyond the designated records; thus, in
United States v. Guerrina5 5 an agent who was provided with
47 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602.
4SApplication of House, 144 F.Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Blumberg v.
United States, 222 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp.
674, 677 (S.D. N.Y. 1953).
49222 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955).
50 Smith v. United States, 236 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 909 (1957); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953);
O]son v. United States, 191 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1951); Myres v. United States,
174 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 849 (1949).
51Murby v. United States, 293 Fed. 849 (1st Cir. 1923).
52 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
53 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602.
54 United States v. Kraus, 270 F. 578 (S.D. N.Y. 1921).
55 112 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Pa. 1953), opinion modified, 126 F. Supp. 609
(E.D. Pa. 1955).
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facilities on the taxpayer's premises could not introduce evidence
which he discovered while rummaging through a desk in the
taxpayer's absence.
The scope of the Guerrina case is limited to the type of ex-
treme situation presented in it.5" This seems unfortunate since
many times it is more convenient for all parties to allow the
revenue agent to conduct his investigation on the taxpayer's
premises. However, in order to follow this expedient practice,
it seems necessary that the taxpayer be sure that the agent will
not treat his presence on the premises as an invitation to ransack
them.
A taxpayer can waive his fourth amendment rights.57 Further,
since only unreasonable searches are prohibited, it would seem
that an agent of the taxpayer might waive his fourth amend-
ment privilege without the taxpayer realizing it.58 A taxpayer
who does not immediately claim his fourth amendment priv-
ilege may later do so, but will not be protected from evidence
uncovered earlier.59
CONCLUSION
The previous discussion has not attempted to emphasize
broad policy considerations, but it seems clear that suppression
of evidence problems in the criminal tax field are dominated by
the fundamental conflict between the government's need to en-
force the revenue laws and the society's need to protect the in-
dividual citizen. Proceeding from these conflicting policies, it is
possible to suggest the areas in which the courts may give greater
emphasis to the demands of one policy rather than the other.
The statutory protection against unnecessary examinations,
granted by section 7605(b), was not enacted to aid defendants
in criminal cases and has not generally been given that effect.
Further, it does not seem reasonable to expect courts in the
future to interpret it in any different manner.
The type of concealed investigation typified by the joint in-
56United States v. Wolrich, 129 F. Supp. 528 (S.D. N.Y. 1955); Banks v.
United States, 204 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1953), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 905 (1955); but see United States v. Lipschitz, 132 F. Supp.
519 (E.D. N.Y. 1954).
VEggleton v. United States, 227 F.2d 493 (6th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 826 (1956).
58 C . Wiggins v. United States, 64 F.2d 950 (9th Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
290 U.S. 657 (1933).
59 E.g., Lisansky v. United States, 31 F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1929).
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vestigation is inherently controversial since it frequently in-
volves the development of evidence obtained from an unwarned
and unsuspecting taxpayer. The abuses which can flourish if
such a technique is applied with excessive zeal, at the expense
of the individual under investigation, will no doubt continue
to be a matter of concern to courts in the future as in the past.
60
However, so long as revenue must be collected, it is only reason-
able to predict that some such investigatory technique will be
tolerated by the courts.
There are obvious inconsistencies in the area of confidential
communications since a taxpayer may communicate freely with
his attorney but must deal with his accountant at his own peril.
The specialized character of tax proceedings, demanding the
services of skilled accountants, furnishes a persuasive argument
for extending a privilege to communications with accountants
but there is, as yet, little indication that such a privilege will be
recognized.
The relevant constitutional problems are not uniquely those
of the tax field, although the question of suppression of incrim-
inating documents reaches its greatest importance in this area.
The great unanswered question is the effect to be given the
Shapiro doctrine as a possible limitation on the right to with-
hold incriminating documents. As yet, there is little indication
that Shapiro will shape the law in the tax field, but it is neces-
sary to recognize that it is available to courts which may wish
to apply it.
60 E.g., United States v. Lipschitz, supra note 56.
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